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Abstract 
We have two hypotheses in our paper: higher institutional ownership is associated 
with lower abnormal returns because of less information asymmetry, or is associated with 
higher abnormal returns because of institutional investors’ ability to pick better stocks. 
We test which of these two hypotheses concerning the effect of institutions dominates. 
We categorize all companies listed on the 13F schedule of Thompson-Reuters over the 
period 1980-2014 into five portfolios and rebalance the portfolios annually based on their 
level of institutional ownership percentage. We determine portfolio’s abnormal return by 
conducting regression on portfolio returns based on CAPM and Fama French and Carhart 
four-factor model. Our finding is, in general, portfolios with higher institutional 
ownership tend to have higher abnormal returns. We also find that the higher the 
institutional ownership percentage of one portfolio, the more five-year periods during 
which the portfolio has abnormal returns. In addition, the abnormal returns of portfolio 
formed by going long on highest-institutional-ownership and short on lowest-institutional 
ownership portfolio are significantly positive based on CAPM Model from 1980 to 2014 
but are not significantly different from zero in most five-year time periods. 
 
Keywords: Institutional Ownership; Abnormal Return; Alpha 
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1:  Introduction 
The main concern of institutional investors is achieving abnormal return. Our 
paper analyses the relationship between institutional ownership percentage and abnormal 
returns, on which we have two hypotheses.  
One of the hypotheses is that higher institutional ownership is associated with 
lower abnormal returns. Much of the literature on institutional ownership provides 
evidence that firms with higher institutional ownership have weaker information 
asymmetry for different reasons, such as voluntary disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991), process of acquiring information (Szewczyk, Tsetsekos and Varma, 1992) and 
media coverage (Tetlock, 2010).  Reduced asymmetric information could reduce the cost 
of raising capitals in an imperfectly competitive market (Armstron, Core, Tylor and 
Verrecchia, 2011). This suggests that there is less risk involved in trading shares with 
high institutional ownership. Thus we would expect that firms with higher institutional 
ownership have lower abnormal returns. 
Another hypothesis is that higher institutional ownership is associated with higher 
abnormal returns because institutional investors are able to pick stocks with better 
performance. As Puckett and Yan (2011) find, institutions earn significant abnormal 
returns within the trading quarter. Some studies find that firms with higher institutional 
ownership perform better in bidder returns (Duggal and Millar, 1999), abnormal returns 
at the time of the subsequent announcement of quarter earnings (Ali, Durtschi, Lev and 
Trombely, 2004), and operating cash flow returns (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and 
Tehranian, 2007). 
We do not have ex-ante prediction but rather test to see which of our two 
hypotheses concerning the effect of institutions dominates: reduction in information 
asymmetry or capacity to pick better stocks. We categorize all companies listed on the 
13F schedule of Thompson-Reuters into five portfolios and rebalance the portfolios 
annually based on their level of institutional ownership percentage. The cut-off for 
  2 
inclusion in a particular portfolio is determined by the empirical distribution of 
institutional holding across firms at the end of a calendar year prior to the holding period 
of the portfolio.  Following the Approach of Fama and French (1992), we determine 
portfolios’ abnormal returns by applying the Fama and French (1993) and a momentum 
factor (Carhart, 1997) model. We repeat the analysis for five- year intervals during the 
period 1980 to 2014.  
Our main finding is that, in general, portfolios with higher institutional ownership 
tend to have higher abnormal returns. We also find that the higher the institutional 
ownership percentage of the portfolio, the more five-year periods during which the 
portfolio has abnormal returns. 
The content of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant 
studies on the institutional ownership’s influence on information asymmetry, the impact 
of information asymmetry and firms’ performance and institutional ownership. Section 3 
introduces the data analysis and methodology we applied in paper. Section 4 discusses 
the results. Section 5 concludes our analysis. 
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2: Literature Review 
Much of the literature on institutional ownership provides evidence that higher 
institutional ownership is associated with weaker information asymmetry. As 
Chakravarty (2001) showed, institutional investors are better informed. Voluntary 
disclosure is one reason why institutional investors seems to be better informed. Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) find that firms with high level of disclosure, which is associated 
with increased institutional ownership, have less asymmetry information. In essence this 
results means that it is not really institutions that are better informed, but rather the firms 
that they tend to hold, have a better information environment. Nevertheless, institutional 
ownership serves as a reasonable proxy for the degree of level of disclosure. In addition, 
the process of acquiring information could also reduce information asymmetries. 
Szewczyk, Tsetsekos and Varma (1992) claim that institutional investors could lessen 
preannouncement information asymmetries between managers and the capital market 
through the activities of information acquisition. Exogenous coverage could also reduce 
asymmetric information, according to Tetlock (2010), media coverage is positively 
correlated with institutional ownership. More specifically, Baik, Kang and Kim (2010) 
find that the level of and change in local institutional ownership predict future stock 
returns. O’Neill and Judith Swisher (2003) claim that higher institutional ownership is 
associated with a low degree of informed trading. Thus, one can conclude that the 
literature is relatively consistent in agreeing that higher levels of institutional ownership 
are associated with reduced information asymmetry. 
As many previous studies suggest, one of the impacts of reduced asymmetric 
information is reduced cost of raising capitals, and hence we would expect that higher 
institutional ownership will be associated with lower abnormal returns. Armstrong, Core, 
Taylor and Verrecchia (2011) find that when markets are imperfect, information 
asymmetry is positively associated with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk 
factors. Similarly, Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2012) find in an imperfectly 
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competitive market, a higher degree of market illiquidity raises the cost of capital.  
Another impact is larger trading volume, Chae (2005) suggest that prior to scheduled 
announcements, reduced information asymmetry could improve cumulative trading 
volume. 
In terms of firms’ performance and institutional ownership, there are studies that 
find that firms with more institution holdings perform better in stock returns, bidder 
returns, operating performance, etc. Duggal and Millar (1999) provide the evidence of a 
positive relation between bidder returns and institutional ownership. Ali, Durtschi, Lev 
and Trombely (2004) focus on the abnormal return at the time of the subsequent 
announcement of the firm’s quarterly earnings, which is found positively associated with 
the change in institutional ownership. Using a firm’s operating cash flow returns as 
measurement, Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian (2007) find a positive relation 
between a firm’s operating performance and institutional ownership. The reason why 
firms with higher institutional ownership performs better may be that institutional 
investors’ have better stock-picking skills. Andy Puckett and Xuemin (Sterling) Yan 
(2011) find strong evidence that institutional investors earn significant abnormal returns 
on their trades within the trading quarter. But many other researchers claim that few 
institutional investors are able to produce statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns net of costs (Fama and French, 2010 and Barras, Scaillet and Wermers, 2010). 
Given the above, we have not ex-ante prediction but rather test to see which of the 
two hypotheses concerning the effect of institutions dominates: reduction in information 
asymmetry or ability to pick better stocks.  We applied the Fama and French (1993) and a 
momentum factor (Carhart, 1997) model, to calculate alpha (abnormal return) in order to 
find out the relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal returns. 
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3: Data and Methodology 
 
Figure 1 
We explore the relationship between institutional ownership percentage and 
abnormal return using CAPM model (Jack Treynor, 1961; William F. Sharpe, 1964; John 
Lintner, 1965a,b  and Jan Mossin, 1966, independently) and Fama - French and Carhart 
four factor model. (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). The data of this analysis 
comes mainly from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The monthly returns, 
from April 1980 to December 2014 (418 months), of all the 13F schedule of Thompson-
Reuters companies source from Security files of CRSP database. The Fama – French 
Portfolios and Factors database provides the factors on a monthly basis of using CAPM 
model (Jack Treynor, 1961; William F. Sharpe, 1964; John Lintner, 1965a,b  and Jan 
Mossin, 1966, independently) and Fama - French and Carhart four factor model. (Fama 
and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). The institutional ownership percentage, percent of 
shares outstanding, derived from Stock ownership summary of Thomson Reuters 













mean value 10 percentile median value 90 percentile
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shown in Figure 1, institutional ownership percentage showed an overall upward trend on 
all levels except for 10 percentile level, which is relatively stable at around 0%. 
We classified all the company data every year into five different portfolios based 
on the average level of institutional ownership percentage. The cut-off for inclusion in a 
particular portfolio is determined by the empirical distribution of institutional holding 
across firms. Portfolio 1 has lowest institutional ownership of 2% with 1.31% mean raw 
return. Whereas portfolio 5 has highest institutional ownership of 78% with 1.76% mean 
raw return (See Table 1). Results shows that portfolios with higher average institutional 
ownership have higher mean market value and higher mean raw return. 
To further exploring the relationship between institutional ownership and raw 
return. We test the significance of difference in mean raw return across two adjacent 
portfolios. Interestingly, the difference between mean raw return of portfolio 1 and 2 is 
significant at 0.01 level, much greater than those of other two adjacent portfolios. 
We used the approach introduced by Fama and French (1992). The core idea of 
this method is to build a portfolio of companies, which are followed by institutions, and 
the abnormal return of this portfolio is defined as abnormal return that cannot be 
explained by risk-factor models (CAPM model (Jack Treynor, 1961; William F. Sharpe, 
1964; John Lintner, 1965a,b  and Jan Mossin, 1966, independently) and Fama - French 
and Carhart four factor model. (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) used to predict 
expected returns. Below are models we use:  
CAPM model (Jack Treynor, 1961; William F. Sharpe, 1964; John Lintner, 1965a,b  and 
Jan Mossin, 1966, independently) : 
    [ ( ) ( )] ( )R t RF t a b RM t RF t e t                                                                                (1) 
where: 
R: the valued-weighted or equal-weighted monthly rate of return of each portfolio 
RM - RF: the market over risk-free return 
Fama - French and Carhart four factor model. (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997): 
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   R t - RF t = a + b[RM(t) - RF(t)] + sSMB(t) + hHML(t) + uUMD(t) + e(t)                                     (2) 
where: 
R: the valued-weighted or equal-weighted monthly rate of return of each portfolio 
RM - RF: the market over risk-free return 
SMB: the monthly premium of the size factor 
HML: the monthly premium of the book-to-market factor 
UMD: the monthly premium on winners minus losers 
Following the approach of Fama and French (1992), we calculate the monthly 
portfolio returns (either equal-weighted or value-weighted) of each portfolio within these 
418 months. The portfolios are rebalanced annually, depending on the level of total 
institutional holding as of December of that year, and are held for the following year.  We 
determine portfolios’ abnormal returns (a) by regressing the monthly equal-weighted or 
value-weighted returns using the CAPM model (Jack Treynor, 1961; William F. Sharpe, 
1964; John Lintner, 1965a,b  and Jan Mossin, 1966, independently) and Fama - French 
and Carhart four factor model. (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). The market over 
risk-free return (RM-RF) is the only risk factor in CAPM model. The Fama-French and 
Cahart four-factor model has following factors: the monthly return of the market less the 
risk free rate (RM-RF), the monthly premium of the size factor (SMB), monthly premium 
of the book-to-market factor (HML) and the monthly premium on winners minus losers 
(UMD) from Fama-French and Cahart four-factor (1993) and Carhart (1997).  Within the 
regression, the abnormal return is the dependent variable and the risk factors are the 
independent variables. 
Then, we analyse the abnormal returns of each portfolio at a five-year interval 
from 1980 to 2014 based on based on regression of monthly equal - weighted and value – 
weighted return using Fama-French and Cahart four-factor model. 
Finally, we regress the monthly return of a new portfolio constructed by going 
long on portfolio 5 and short on portfolio 1, either equal – weighted or value – weighted, 
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using both CAPM model (Jack Treynor, 1961; William F. Sharpe, 1964; John Lintner, 
1965a,b  and Jan Mossin, 1966, independently) and Fama - French and Carhart four 
factor model. (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) to get the abnormal return. We 
also did this again in five – year interval. This long – short portfolio approach is more 
appropriate because it is a self-financing portfolio in which you go long and short. In this 
way, if we fail to have a “correct” asset pricing model or to estimate the factor loadings 
correctly, then they can cancel each other (on average) because of the simultaneous long 
and short positions. 
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4: Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the five portfolios formed based on the 
average level of institutional ownership percentage. On average, higher institutional 
holdings is correlated with higher market value of firms. Interestingly, the table indicates 
that a higher level of institutional ownership is associated with a higher mean raw return. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the five portfolios formed based on the average level of  
institutional ownership percentage over the 1980-2014 period 
Equal-weighted portfolios are formed at the end of each calendar year depending on the 
level of total institutional holding as of December of that year, and are held for the 
following year. The cut-off for inclusion in a particular portfolio is determined by the 
empirical distribution of institutional holding across firms. Portfolio 1 is associated with 
lowest level of institutional ownership, while portfolio 5 is associated with the highest 
level of institutional ownership. 






1 1.31% 387.52 2% 
2 1.65% 298.14 15% 
3 1.68% 395.91 38% 
4 1.70% 762.90 59% 
5 1.76% 1205.00 78% 
In Table 2 we test the significance of difference in mean raw return between 
portfolio 1 and each of other portfolios respectively. The mean raw return of portfolio 1 is 
significantly different from all the other portfolios at 0.01 confidence level. There is a 
clear ordering in raw return – portfolios with larger institutional ownership are associate 
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with a higher return. It is clear from the findings the higher institutional ownership 
percentage the portfolio has, the greater difference it has when compared with portfolio 1. 
Table 2 
Difference in mean raw return between lowest institutional ownership portfolio 
(portfolio 1) and other portfolios formed on average level of institutional ownership 
percentage equity during 1980-2014, 35 years 
Equal-weighted portfolios are formed at the end of each calendar year depending on the level 
of total institutional holding as of December of that year, and are held for the following year. 
The cut-off for inclusion in a particular portfolio is determined by the empirical distribution of 
institutional holding across firms. Portfolio 1 is associated with lowest level of institutional 
ownership, while portfolio 5 is associated with the highest level of institutional ownership. 
Portfolio 
Difference of Mean Raw 
Return (in percent) 
Standard Error of 
Difference 
t  - 
statistics 
mean(1) - mean(2) -0.3463 0.0546 -6.34 
mean(1) - mean(3) -0.3778 0.0529 -7.14 
mean(1) - mean(4) -0.3968 0.0501 -7.92 
mean(1) - mean(5) -0.4571 0.0477 -9.57 
Table 3 contains abnormal returns of five portfolios during April 1980 to 
December 2014, 418 months. Following the approach of Fama and French (1992), we 
calculated the monthly portfolio returns (either equal-weighted or value-weighted) of 
each portfolio within these 418 months. The portfolios are rebalanced annually, 
depending on the level of total institutional holding as of December of that year, and are 
held for the following year.  We determine portfolios’ abnormal returns by regressing the 
monthly equal-weighted or value-weighted returns using the CAPM model or Fama-
French and Cahart four-factor model. Results of these four regression show that all five 
portfolios have significant positive abnormal returns at 0.01 confidence level, but there is 
less of a clear ordering when moving from portfolio 1 to portfolio 5. This is a somewhat 
surprising result, and we do not have clear intuition to why this is the case. In general, we 
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would expect to see both positive and negative alphas. Generally, the portfolio has higher 
institutional ownership tends to have higher abnormal return, which is inconsistent with 
one of our hypotheses that higher-institutional ownership portfolio is supposed to have 
lower abnormal return because of lower level of information asymmetry.  
One possibility is that institutional investors are professional, and tend to be good 
price pickers. Hence, causality runs the other way, in which case institutional investors 
flock to the better stocks. However, this is contrary to much of the literature on 
institutional investors performance. Fama and French (2010) indicates that few mutual 
funds produce benchmark-adjusted expected returns greater than their costs. Similarly, 
Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010) find that 75% mutual funds exhibit zero abnormal 
returns net of expenses. In addition, Jonathan Lewellen (2011) claims that from 1980 to 
2007, little evidence of institutional investors ability to predict stock returns could be 
provided by the returns of institutional investors. Differently than the previous studies, 
Andy Puckett and Xuemin (Sterling) Yan (2011) find strong evidence that institutional 
investors earn significant abnormal returns on their trades within the trading quarter; they 
claim that the trading skills documented by previous studies that use quarterly data are 
biased downwards because of their inability to account for interim trades. 
For stocks that few institutions hold, the severe information asymmetry may lead 
to high unsystematically riskiness and thus higher abnormal returns.   
In conclusion, it is possible that the causes of abnormal returns of low-
institutional-ownership and high-institutional-ownership portfolios are different. Unlike 
portfolios with lower institutional ownership that have abnormal returns because of more 
serious asymmetric information, portfolios with higher institutional ownership have 
abnormal returns owing to institutional investors’ behaviour and annually rebalance of 
portfolios. 
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Table 3 
Abnormal returns of five portfolios formed on average level of institutional ownership 
percentage equity during April 1980 to December 2014, 418 months.  
Equal-weighted portfolios are formed at the end of each calendar year depending on the 
level of total institutional holding as of December of that year, and are held for the 
following year. The cut-off for inclusion in a particular portfolio is determined by the 
empirical distribution of institutional holding across firms. Portfolio 1 is associated with 
lowest level of institutional ownership, while portfolio 5 is associated with the highest level 
of institutional ownership. 
There are four regressions for each portfolio:  
(1). Regression of monthly equal weighted return based on the CAPM Model. 
(2). Regression of monthly value weighted return based on the Fama – French Model. 
(3). Regression of monthly equal weighted return based on the CAPM Model. 
(4). Regression of monthly value weighted return based on the Fama – French Model. 
 Regression of Equal–Weighted Return Regression of Value–Weighted Return 
Portfolio CAPM Model Fama–French 
Model 
CAPM Model Fama–French 
Model 
1 0.0032*** 0.0011*** 0.0073*** 0.0077*** 
2 0.0062*** 0.0064*** 0.0051*** 0.0046*** 
3 0.0055*** 0.0055*** 0.0057*** 0.0062*** 
4 0.0056*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 
5 0.0063*** 0.0060*** 0.0080*** 0.0075*** 
* Significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
***Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
 













1980 - 1984 1985 - 1989 1990 - 1994 1995 - 1999 2000 - 2004 2005 - 2009 2010 - 2014
Abnormal returns of five portfolios  at a five- year interval during April 
1980 to December 2014  based on regression of monthly equal - weighted 
return
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5
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Figure 3 
We next derive the abnormal returns of five portfolios at a five-year interval 
based on Fama-French Model. As Table 4 shows, portfolios with stocks having lower 
institutional investor holdings (i.e. portfolio 1 and portfolio 2) have fewer statistically 
significant abnormal returns and some negative alphas. This finding implies that although 
portfolios with lower institutional ownership sometimes have relatively high abnormal 
returns, it does not always happen. On the contrary, the higher the institutional ownership 
percentage of the portfolio, the more time periods during which the portfolio has 
statistically abnormal returns. This finding confirms our prediction that that the causes of 
abnormal returns of low-institutional-ownership and high-institutional-ownership 
portfolios are different. Additionally, as shown in figure 2 and figure 3, surprisingly we 









1980 - 1984 1985 - 1989 1990 - 1994 1995 - 1999 2000 - 2004 2005 - 2009 2010 - 2014
Abnormal returns of five portfolios  at a five- year interval during April 
1980 to December 2014 based on regression of monthly value - weighted 
return 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5
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Table 4 
Abnormal returns of five portfolios formed on average level of institutional ownership 
percentage equity at a five – year interval during April 1980 to December 2014 
Equal-weighted portfolios are formed at the end of each calendar year depending on the level of 
total institutional holding as of December of that year, and are held for the following year. The 
cut-off for inclusion in a particular portfolio is determined by the empirical distribution of 
institutional holding across firms. Portfolio 1 is associated with lowest level of institutional 
ownership, while portfolio 5 is associated with the highest level of institutional ownership. 
There are two regressions for each portfolio every five years:  
(1). Regression of monthly equal weighted return based on Fama – French Model. 
(2). Regression of monthly value weighted return based on Fama – French Model. 
 Regression of Equal – Weighted Return Regression of Value – Weighted Return 
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1980-1984 -0.0004 0.0028** 0.0036*** 0.0051** 0.0062***  0.0020 0.0005 0.0027 0.0038** 0.0071*** 
1985-1989 0.0070*** 0.0062*** 0.0047*** 0.0034*** 0.0029*  0.0116** 0.0057*** 0.0051*** 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 
1990-1994 -0.0009 0.0044*** 0.0055*** 0.0083*** 0.0099***  0.0030 0.0045** 0.0029** 0.0057*** 0.0086*** 
1995-1999 0.0017 0.0070** 0.0062*** 0.0050*** 0.0068***  0.0079 0.0088** 0.0113*** 0.0069*** 0.0084*** 
2000-2004 0.0054* 0.0131*** 0.0107*** 0.0099*** 0.0109***  0.0110** 0.0044 0.0094*** 0.0079*** 0.0112*** 
2005-2009 0.0071** 0.0076*** 0.0071*** 0.0059*** 0.0063*** 0.0180*** 0.0106*** 0.0061*** 0.0076*** 0.0087*** 
2010-2014 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0015 0.0021*** 0.0013* -0.0038 -0.0065** 0.0014 0.0025*** 0.0046*** 
* Significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
***Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
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Figure 4 
Table 5 presents the abnormal returns of the new portfolio formed by 
simultaneously long portfolio 5 and short portfolio 1 at the same month. Table 6 presents 
the results of same portfolio but at a five-year interval. This approach is more appropriate 
because it is a self-financing portfolio in which you go long and short. In this way, if we 
fail to have a “correct” asset pricing model or to estimate the factor loadings correctly, 
then they can cancel each other (on average) because of the simultaneous long and short 
positions.  
Generally, the abnormal returns of this new portfolio are positive and statistically 
significant if based on CAPM Model. Thus it is possible to get abnormal return by going 
long on higher-institutional-ownership and short lower-institutional-ownership portfolio 
in the long run. However, in terms of investing in the short run, in most five-year time 
periods, the abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero and occasionally 
are significantly negative. As figure 4 shows, the abnormal return of portfolio formed by 
going long on portfolio 5 and short on portfolio 1 has no obvious pattern. But we can see 
that firms with high institutional ownership did better in the 90’s but underperformed in 







1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014
Abnormal returns of the portfolios formed by going long on portfolio 5 
and short on  portfolio 1 at five - year intervals during April 1980 to 
December 2014
Regression of Equal – Weighted Return Regression of Value – Weighted Return
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Table 5 
Abnormal returns of the portfolio formed by going long on highest (portfolio 5) and 
short on lowest (portfolio 1) institutional ownership percentage portfolio during 
April 1980 to December 2014, 418 months. 
Equal-weighted portfolios are formed at the end of each calendar year depending on the 
level of total institutional holding as of December of that year, and are held for the 
following year. The cut-off for inclusion in a particular portfolio is determined by the 
empirical distribution of institutional holding across firms. Portfolio 1 is associated with 
lowest level of institutional ownership, while portfolio 5 is associated with the highest 
level of institutional ownership. 
The monthly return of the new portfolio, formed by going long on portfolio 5 and short 
on portfolio 1, either value-weighted or equal-weighted, was regressed based on CAPM 
Model and Fama - French Model to get abnormal return. 
 CAPM Model Fama – French Model 
Regression on Equal–Weighted 
Return 
    0.0030**     0.0028* 
Regression on Value–Weighted 
Return 
0.0007 -0.0002 
* Significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
***Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
 
  
  18 
Table 6 
Abnormal returns of the portfolios formed by going long on highest (portfolio 5) 
and short on lowest (portfolio 1) institutional ownership percentage portfolio at 
 five–year intervals during April 1980 to December 2014 
Equal-weighted portfolios are formed at the end of each calendar year depending on the 
level of total institutional holding as of December of that year, and are held for the 
following year. The cut-off for inclusion in a particular portfolio is determined by the 
empirical distribution of institutional holding across firms. Portfolio 1 is associated with 
lowest level of institutional ownership, while portfolio 5 is associated with the highest 
level of institutional ownership. 
The monthly return of the new portfolio, formed by going long on portfolio 5 and short 
on portfolio 1, either value-weighted or equal-weighted,  was regressed based on Fama - 
French Model every five years in order to get abnormal returns. 
 
Regression of Equal – 
Weighted Return 
Regression of Value – 
Weighted Return 
1980-1984   0.0067 0.0051 
1985-1989 -0.0041 -0.0084* 
1990-1994      0.0108*** 0.0056 
1995-1999  0.0051 0.0005 
2000-2004  0.0055 0.0003 
2005-2009                     - 0.0008 -0.0093* 
2010-2014                       0.0016    0.0084** 
* Significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
***Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
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5: Conclusion 
Our paper explores the relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal 
return. We conclude that, in general, portfolios with higher institutional ownership tend 
to have abnormal return than those with lower institutional ownership. The higher the 
institutional ownership percentage of the portfolio, the more five-year periods during 
which the portfolio has abnormal returns.  But some low-institutional ownership 
portfolios also have relatively high abnormal returns over the period 1980-2014. The 
causes of abnormal returns of low and high institutional ownership portfolios are 
different. Unlike portfolios with lower institutional ownership that have abnormal returns 
because of higher level of asymmetry of information, portfolios with higher institutional 
ownership have abnormal returns owing to institutional investors’ professional stock-
picking skills.   
It is possible to get abnormal return by going long on higher-institutional-
ownership and short on lower-institutional-ownership portfolio in the long run because 
the abnormal returns of this portfolio are significantly positive based on CAPM Model 
from 1980 to 2014. However, in terms of investing in the short run, in most five-year 
time periods, the abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero and 
occasionally are significantly negative. Additionally, we almost always get positive 
abnormal returns in different time periods, which deserves further research. 
The results of our paper have relevance for companies listed on Thomson Reuters, 
a possible reason for our findings is that higher companies not on Thomson-Reuters have 
a negative abnormal return. 
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